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Abstract:
We focus on the effects of changing costs of effort in the minimum-effort coordination game. We
find three main results. First, as the cost of effort increases, the level of effort decreases. Second, as
the cost of effort increases, the convergence speed to an equilibrium also increases. Third, the overall
efficiency (average payoff) does not monotonically decrease as the cost of effort increases. Average
payoff decreases for the most part but actually increases when the cost of effort is very high. Even
though groups are converging towards worse equilibria as the cost increases, they are converging
faster, and therefore lose less due to fewer periods of non-coordination. This non-monotonicity in
the average payoff suggests that individuals may be better off with higher costs of effort.
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1 Introduction
The inability to coordinate in economic interactions in which there are multiple equilibria can
lead to significant welfare losses. Though all players may be better off in one equilibrium, other
factors can make it difficult for players to coordinate to the Pareto-improved equilibrium. In these
situations, it is important to know which equilibrium is best and what causes certain equilibria to
be selected over others. The majority of work that has been done examining coordination problems
looks at which environments are good for coordination and how to avoid getting stuck in a “bad”
equilibrium. This paper differs from these works in that it not only examines the equilibrium
reached, but also focuses on the process of reaching equilibrium. Though the same equilibrium
may be reached in two different environments, the equilibrium may be reached more efficiently in
one environment, which could make overall welfare higher.
We focus our attention on the minimum-effort coordination game (MECG). In the MECG, the
player’s payoffs are determined by the group’s minimum effort while the cost is determined by
the individual’s own choice of effort. The MECG has multiple Pareto-ranked pure-strategy Nash
Equilibria in which each player exerts the same amount of effort. The MECG has been widely
studied as a simplified model used to examine a group’s ability to coordinate.
We examine the impact of having different costs of effort on the MECG. We run experiments
with five different cost parameters and provide three main results. First, there is a negative rela-
tionship between cost of effort and the average effort level. Therefore, as the cost of effort increases,
the players tend to converge to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Second, we find that the game
converges faster as the cost of effort increases. Furthermore, we find that the players deviate less
frequently after the convergence to an equilibrium when the cost of effort is higher. This is because
the cost of non-convergence is much higher when the cost of effort is higher. Lastly, we find a
non-monotonic relationship between the cost of effort and average payoff. Not surprisingly, the
average profit decreases as the cost of effort increases, for the most part. However, when the cost
of effort is very high, the increase in the cost may lead to higher average payoffs. This result is due
to a combination of negative and positive effects of increasing the cost of effort. The two negative
effects come from 1) the first result, which is the negative relationship between cost of effort and the
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average effort level, and 2) by the fact that for a given strategy profile, higher cost of effort provides
lower payoff. The positive effect comes from the second result, which is the faster convergence in
the game for higher cost of effort levels. Despite the two negative forces suggesting that payoffs
should be decreasing as the cost of effort increases, the positive force can be significant enough
to increase the average payoff. For relatively low costs, coordination failure is relatively cheap;
therefore, in the early periods players routinely exert effort above the minimum effort. When the
cost is very high, however, coordination failure is expensive; therefore, players are less likely to
experiment and exert effort above the minimum effort. In sum, we find that the gain in efficiency
from faster convergence actually outweighs the other forces, which are driving payoffs down as the
cost of effort increases.
The MECG has intrigued experimental economists for many years. The experimental laboratory
provides an ideal testing spot to determine which environments may lead to “good” and “bad”
equilibria in the game. Typical studies have examined the effect of two different environments on
a group’s ability to coordinate on the “good” equilibrium. Commonly studied parameters include
group size (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1990), Knez and Camerer (1994), Van Huyck,
Battalio, and Beil (1990), Weber (2006)) and cost of effort (Goeree and Holt (2005), Romero
(2011)). These papers typically found that coordination becomes more difficult as the size of the
group increased or as the cost of effort increased. Other papers have looked at the effect of adding
additional characteristics to the environment on the groups’ ability to coordinate. To name a
few, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1992) allowed group members to communicate, Cachon
and Camerer (1996) required an entry fee to join the group, and Myung (2009) had multiple
groups competing with each other. This paper is most similar to Goeree and Holt (2005) in which
the researchers ran experiments with varying cost of effort. They examined the MECG with a
continuous strategy space in which subjects faced one of two costs (c = 0.25 and c = 0.75). They
found that in the low cost treatment, effort levels were higher and gradually increased over time,
while in the high cost treatment, the effort levels were lower and typically decreased over time.
Our paper differs from the above works in several key aspects. First, rather than just analyzing
two parameter values, we consider five different levels of effort cost. This is important because it
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allows us to discover non-monotonicities which would be impossible to discover by testing only two
parameter values. One difficulty in using a large number of parameter values is that it requires
more experiments to be run, which requires more subjects. To better select the parameter values, a
computational model proposed by Romero (2010) was used to run simulations and determine precise
values for the parameters to be used in the experiments. In addition, we study the efficiency losses
that are caused by slower convergence to an equilibrium. This sheds an interesting new light on the
previously found result that groups with higher cost converge to lower effort equilibria. Though
higher costs tend to lead to worse equilibria, they are also associated with faster convergence, which
in the short-run can be beneficial to the group.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a short introduction to the
minimum-effort coordination game. Next, we proceed with the testable hypotheses and our ex-
perimental design. We then provide the experimental results and the concluding remarks.
2 Minimum-Effort Coordination Game
The minimum-effort coordination game (MECG), also known as the weakest-link game, is a game
with N players in which each player chooses an effort level si ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}, where M is finite.
The players have payoff function
pi = αmin
j∈N
{sj} − csi + δ, (1)
where α > c > 0 and δ ∈ R for all players i ∈ N . The best response in this game is for player i to




Therefore, the set of pure-strategy Nash Equilibria contains any strategy profiles in which all players
exert the same effort level: σ = {s1, ..., sN}, where s1 = s2 = ... = sN . These equilibria are Pareto
ranked, with si = 1 being the worst and si = M being the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
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2.1 Hypotheses
We propose three hypotheses for our experiments on the MECG. As the cost of effort increases,
Hypothesis 1 (Effort Level) average effort decreases,
Hypothesis 2 (Convergence Speed) the game converges faster, and
Hypothesis 3 (Average Payoff) average payoff does not decrease monotonically. Average
payoff will decrease initially but will increase when the cost of effort is very high.
Hypothesis 1 is driven by the historical observation listed in the introduction as well as the
increase in the risk-dominance of the inefficient equilibrium.1 The previous literatures point to the
inability to coordinate to payoff dominant equilibrium increases when the cost of effort is higher.
Hypothesis 2 is driven simply by the structure of the game; not being able to coordinate causes
higher penalty, in both absolute payoff as well as percentage of payoff, when the cost of effort is
high. Lastly, hypothesis 3 is driven by the negative welfare effect of the higher cost of effort and the
positive welfare effect of the increase in the convergence speed of the game. When the convergence
speed is not fast, the lower average effort and the higher cost of effort decreases the average payoff.
When the cost is extremely high, the increase in the convergence speed decreases the loss in payoff
due to miscoordination. In other words, the ability to correctly coordinate to even the inefficient




The experiments were conducted at the California Social Science Laboratory (CASSEL) located
in the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). A total of 60 subjects participated in the
experiments. The average performance-based payment was 20USD with the standard deviation
of $1.55. All students were registered with the CASSEL and were recruited by the CASSEL’s
1For the MECG, for any two pair of equilibria, increasing cost of effort increases the risk-dominance of the
inefficient equilibrium with everything else held constant.
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electronic announcement system. The CASSEL consists of over 30 working computers divided into
cubicles, which prevents participants from viewing other participants’ screens.
The experiments were programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). The instructions were available both in print as well as on screen for the participants. The
experimenter explained the instructions in detail out loud. Participants were also given a brief quiz
after the instructions to ensure proper understanding of the game and the software. A copy of the
instructions and a sample screenshot are available in the appendix.
The subjects were randomly assigned to their roles in the experiment. Furthermore, everyone
participated in only one session. The identity of the participants as well as their individual decisions
were kept as private information. The experiments used a fictitious currency called francs. The
participants were fully aware of the sequence, payoff structure, and length of the experiment.
3.2 Details of the Experiment
There were a total of three sessions, and each session had 20 subjects. Each session consisted of five
blocks. At the beginning of each block, subjects were divided into five groups of four subjects each.
Each group of four subjects then proceeded to play a MECG repeatedly for 15 periods. After each
block, the subjects were randomly rematched (with replacement) to another group of four subjects
and were randomly reassigned another payoff parameter (with replacement). See Figure 1 for the
timeline.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
15 Periods 15 Periods 15 Periods 15 Periods 15 Periods
Rematch Rematch Rematch Rematch
Figure 1: Timeline and Matching Structure for the Experiment
Players played a MECG in which they chose an effort level, si ∈ {1, ..., 7}. Their payoff was
determined by the following function:
pi = 1000 min
j∈N
{sj} − csi + 5950. (3)
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Five different cost parameters were tested, c ∈ {50, 500, 900, 950, 990}. These parameters were
selected within the lower and upper bounds for the cost of effort, c ∈ (0, 1000), and to highlight
the extreme values as well as the middle value. The subjects were shown the payoff table displayed
in Table 1, with the calculations already completed for the subjects. The group size, the random-
ization, and the fact that everyone in the group was using the same payoff table were common
knowledge. However, the group’s own minimum effort was private information for the group and
was not available to the subjects outside of the group. Individuals were not told the effort levels of
all members in their group, just the minimum effort of the group.
Minimum Effort of All Players
i’s Effort 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 12950− 7c 11950− 7c 10950− 7c 9950− 7c 8950− 7c 7950− 7c 6950− 7c
6 − 11950− 6c 10950− 6c 9950− 6c 8950− 6c 7950− 6c 6950− 6c
5 − − 10950− 5c 9950− 5c 8950− 5c 7950− 5c 6950− 5c
4 − − − 9950− 4c 8950− 4c 7950− 4c 6950− 4c
3 − − − − 8950− 3c 7950− 3c 6950− 3c
2 − − − − − 7950− 2c 6950− 2c
1 − − − − − − 6950− c
Table 1: Sample Payoff Table That Was Used in the Experiment
Calculations were already filled in for the subjects.
4 Experimental Results
Figure 2 illustrates sample results from one block of sessions. Figure 2 (a) is an example in which
there is coordination on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium (converging to an effort level of 7),
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and Figure 2 (b) is an example in which there is a coordination on the worst equilibrium (converging
to an effort level of 1).
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(a) Coordination to High Effort (b) Coordination to Low Effort
Figure 2: Sample Results from Single Block of Session for Illustration Purposes
Otherwise specified, we treated each block as an independent observation. Therefore, the sample
size for each cost parameter c is n = 60.
4.1 Effort Level
The average effort level chosen in each period is displayed in Figure 3. First, we tested the hypothesis
that higher cost of effort leads to lower effort levels by the players. Results are taken from the




5 ) as one observation and are displayed in
Figure 4 and Table 2. Confirming our hypothesis, the mean effort level drops from 4.917 to 1.06
as the the cost parameter increases. When we focus our attention to blocks 3, 4, and 5 (the
experienced players), we obtain a stronger support for our hypothesis; the lowest effort level, equal
to one, occurs at c = 990, and the differences in means between various cost parameters are all
significant at p < 0.05 except when comparing the differences between c = 900 and c = 950 (n.s.).
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4.2 Convergence Speed
Comparing convergence speed is not as straightforward as comparing average effort level. Consider
the following example in Figure 5, which shows the period-by-period effort choices of one group of
players. If one were to use a rule that the convergence occurs when there are no deviations (i.e.,
everyone is best responding), then there would not have been any convergence until period 13 in the
example. However, starting in period 4, there were only two deviations in the final 11 periods. This
rule may be too conservative when studying experimental results. We compared the convergence
speed in three different ways. Each one of these measures has its strengths and weaknesses. First,
we compared the standard deviation of the effort levels. Next, we compared the best-response rate.
Finally, for any given period, we considered the number of different effort levels that were played
each period (the fewer, the more converged the group is).
We first consider the standard deviation of the effort levels being played in each period. Figure
6 graphs the standard deviation of the effort levels being played by various cost parameters. The
general idea is that the standard deviation should be low when a game converges to a pure-strategy
equilibrium. We break the analysis of standard deviation into two parts. First, we considered how
fast the standard deviation decreases in the first one-third of the game. We measured the rate of
change in the standard deviation per period by looking at the slope of the regression (SD = α+βt,
Table 3). Conditional on the initial starting point of the standard deviation, steepest downward
slope would indicate the fastest convergence.2 Supporting our hypothesis, the coefficients for c =
900, c = 950, and c = 990 are all negative and are steeper for higher costs of effort (p < 0.05). The
slope for c = 50 is no different from 0 and the slope at c = 500 is upward sloping (p < 0.05), which
indicates a lack of convergence.3 Second, we considered the average standard deviation for the final




10 , Table 4). The magnitudes of the average standard deviation are
SDc=500 = 2.538 > SDc=50 = 2.430 > SDc=950 = 0.973 > SDc=900 = 0.842 > SDc=990 = 0.522; all
but the difference between c = 900 and c = 950 are significant at p < 0.05. What we conclude from
2Of course, this would not be a fair measurement if the starting standard deviation is very small to begin with.
Our data does not have such a problem.
3Finding a slope of 0 for c = 50 and a positive slope of 0.043 for c = 500 added the following result. First, it is
harder to coordinate to the payoff-dominant equilibrium in the c = 500 case compared to the c = 50 case. Given
that the cost of effort is relatively low when c = 500, the players may be trying even harder to increase to the
payoff-dominant equilibrium, in turn, increasing the standard deviation of the effort levels.
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the average standard deviation is that the standard deviation is low (below 1) when cost is high
(c = {900, 950, 990}) and is high (above 2) when the cost is low (c = {50, 500}). Combining the
results from the speed of convergence in the first one-third of the game and the average standard
deviation in the last two-thirds of the game, we conclude that the game does indeed converge faster
with higher cost. When the cost is low, c = {50, 500}, we in fact do not see any convergence. This
is because the cost of miscoordination is relatively low. When the cost is the highest at c = 990,
we see the fastest decrease in the standard deviation and maintain the lowest average standard
deviation of the effort levels throughout.4
Next, we considered the best-response rate of the effort levels played across different costs of
effort (Figure 7). The best-response rate measures the percentage of players who are best responding
in the current period.5 Unlike using the standard deviation of effort levels, the best-response rate
is insensitive to how close or far a single player is from the equilibrium strategy. However, it
also penalizes severely in a situation in which three players may be playing the same effort level
while one player selects an effort level lower than others: {s, s, s, s − 1}; this has a best-response





5 ). The best-response rate is the lowest (average of 0.468) when the cost of effort is low
(c = {50, 500}) and highest (average of 0.708) when the cost of effort is high (c = {900, 950, 990})
with the difference being significant at p < 0.01. When we subdivide the groups by each cost level,
the best-response rates between c = 50 and c = 500, and between c = 900 and c = 950, are not
statistically different from one another. The best-response rate at c = 990 is six percentage points
higher than the best-response rate at c = 950 (p = 0.102) with an even stronger difference when
we focus on the experienced players (blocks 3, 4, and 5): a difference of 16.7 percentage points,
p < 0.01. Considering the average of the first five periods gives an indication of how fast the
game initially converges. Analyzing the average of the last five periods provides an indication of
sustaining the convergence as well as how well the game continues to converge. First, the best-
response rates are higher in the last five periods than the first five periods. Second, similar to the
4As a robustness check, we also regressed the entire 15 periods as SD = α+ β(1/t). The slopes are all significant
at p < 0.02 and the results are consistent with the results in this section.
5As a robustness check, we also measured the best-response rate as the percentage of players who are best
responding to the previous period’s minimum effort. The results are consistent.
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first five periods, the best-response rate is the lowest (average of 0.867) when the cost of effort is low
(c = {50, 500}) and highest (average of 0.960) when the cost of effort is high (c = {900, 950, 990})
with difference being significant at p < 0.01. However, we do not obtain significant differences
when we subdivide the groups by each cost level. In summary, we are only able to draw a weak
conclusion that best-response rate tends to increase as the cost of effort increases.
Finally, we considered both the number of effort levels being played in each group in each
period. Therefore, we would consider the game to be more converged if there were fewer effort
levels being played in a given period. We define this as similarness condition. The added benefit of
the similarness condition is that it does not unreasonably penalize cases in which one person may
deviate significantly away from the best response for just one period. By the same token, it also
means that this measure treats the following two strategy profiles as equally converged: {2, 2, 2, 3}
and {1, 7, 7, 7}. In addition, unlike the best response measure, similarness condition does distinguish
between {2, 2, 3, 3} and {2, 2, 3, 4}. Both strategy profiles have a best-response rate of 2, but the
former only has two effort levels being played while the latter has three. Therefore, the former
strategy profile should be considered closer to being converged than the latter.
Figure 8 shows the frequency of different numbers of effort levels being played for various costs
of effort. If the game is indeed converging faster under the similarness condition, we expect to see a
higher frequency of red and green, which indicates everyone playing the same effort level and three
people playing the same effort level, respectively. As the cost of effort increases, we observe an
increase in frequency of red and green. Furthermore, the frequency of red and green also increases
as the experiment proceeds (number of period increases). In other words, there are many different
effort levels being played in the initial period but the game converges as the periods continue.
Considering the evidence from three different ways of measuring convergence, we conclude that
the game converges faster to an equilibrium as the cost of effort increases. Furthermore, the fastest
sustained convergence is when the cost of effort is c = 990.
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4.3 Average Payoff
Lastly, we analyzed the average payoff as a function of cost of effort. We hypothesized that the
average payoff will first decrease as the cost of effort increases but the average payoff will increase





5 ) and of the entire 15 periods by each cost parameter. As hypothesized, the average
payoff generally decreases as the cost of effort increases. This is expected due to the negative
welfare effect of the higher cost in effort and convergence to a lower equilibrium. When considering
the first five periods, average payoff is the highest at 9,148 when c = 50 (p < 0.01), and second
highest at 6,732 when c = 500 (p < 0.01). The average payoff level is not significantly different
when comparing the difference between c = 900 and c = 950 (5,159 and 5031, respectively). This
is the case when the positive effect of faster convergence offsets the average payoff of higher cost.
In fact, when the cost is c = 990, the average payoff is 5,261 and is higher than the average payoff
at c = 950 by 230 francs (p < 0.12). Furthermore, this effect is even stronger as the players gain
experience: the payoff at c = 990 is 415.7 francs higher than the payoff at c = 950 (p < 0.05).
The general results of the average payoff behavior do not change when we use the average of 15
periods (an entire block) instead of the average of the first five periods. However, as more periods
are played, the positive welfare (convergence speed) from the high cost of effort averages out with
the negative welfare (lower convergence point and higher cost of effort). Meaning, the difference in
average payoff, µ990 − µ950, will decrease as more periods are played. The difference in average is
230 francs when looking at the first five period averages, but the difference decreases to 90 francs
when looking at the 15 period averages. The same is true even with the experienced players; the
difference drops from 415.7 to 179.1. In other words, the non-monotonicity of average payoff is most
salient at the earlier phase of the game. This is due to the fact that the effects of non-convergence
in the early periods are diluted after many periods of convergence.
These results support our hypothesis of the non-monotonicity of the average payoff as a function
of cost of effort; the average payoff decreases as cost of effort increases, for the most part, but
increases when the cost of effort is very high.
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5 Conclusion
We performed a comparative statics of the minimum-effort coordination game via experiments.
The experiments are a nice tool to use for the comparative statics given the Pareto-ranked strict
Nash Equilibria structure of the MECG. In particular, we showed how the outcomes and behaviors
changed as the cost of effort changed. By running experiments across various cost parameters,
we were able to find results that may have been overlooked by experimenting over just two cost
parameters.
First, we showed that players exerted less effort and converged to a Pareto-dominated equilib-
rium as the cost of effort increased. Second, our results showed that the players also converged
faster to an equilibrium for higher levels of cost of effort. Lastly, the average payoff did not strictly
decrease as the cost of effort increased. In fact, the average payoff function is U-shaped, providing
an increasing average payoff as the cost of effort becomes very high.
The behavior in the average payoff is due to the welfare effects of the game. There are two
negative welfare effects and one positive welfare effect. The negative effect is from the convergence
to the lower minimum effort level and the fact that the players receive lower payoff for the exact
same strategy profile. The positive effect is from the increase in the convergence speed of the game.
Hence, the net outcome depends on the difference between the negative and the positive welfare
effects of having a higher cost of effort. This suggests that in certain situations, players may be
better off with higher effort costs as it means they will converge more quickly than they would with
intermediate effort costs.
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Blocks 1 through 5: n=60 Blocks 3, 4, and 5: n=36
Mean SE P-value Mean SE P-value




c = 500 4.457 0.328 3.506 0.386




c = 900 1.187 0.076 1.150 0.067




c = 950 1.257 0.117 1.217 0.128




c = 990 1.060 0.042 1.00 0.00
Table 2: Average Effort of Last Five Periods by Cost
Ho: mean(lower cost) - mean(higher cost) = diff = 0
Ha: diff > 0
Independent Variable Dependent Variables: Standard Deviation of Effort Levels
c = 50 c = 500 c = 900 c = 950 c = 990
Constant 2.135*** 2.112*** 2.777*** 2.936*** 2.630***
(0.096) (0.044) (0.129) (0.070) (0.340)
Period 0.008 0.043** -0.309*** -0.376*** -0.417**
(0.029) (0.013) (0.039) (0.021) (0.103)
R-squared 0.025 0.780 0.955 0.991 0.846
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test).
Number of obs: 5 for each cost. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 3: Regression: Standard Deviation of Effort Levels During First Five Periods
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Mean SE P-value
c = 50 2.430 0.018
0.001
c = 500 2.538 0.021
c = 500 2.538 0.021
0.000
c = 900 0.842 0.093
c = 900 0.842 0.093
0.286
c = 950 0.973 0.075
c = 950 0.973 0.075
0.002
c = 990 0.522 0.099
Table 4: Average Standard Deviation of Effort Levels During Last 10 Periods by Cost
Ho: mean(lower cost) - mean(higher cost) = diff = 0
Ha: diff ! = 0. n = 10 for each cost
Blocks 1 through 5: n=60 Blocks 3, 4, and 5: n=36
Mean SE P-value Mean SE P-value




c = 500 0.480 0.042 0.478 0.057




c = 900 0.687 0.032 0.739 0.038




c = 950 0.687 0.039 0.689 0.047




c = 990 0.750 0.033 0.856 0.031
Table 5: Average Best-Response Rate During First Five Periods
Ho: mean(lower cost) - mean(higher cost) = diff = 0
Ha: diff < 0
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Blocks 1 through 5: n=60 Blocks 3, 4, and 5: n=36
Mean SE P-value Mean SE P-value




c = 500 0.873 0.035 0.894 0.044




c = 900 0.943 0.021 0.961 0.019




c = 950 0.957 0.022 0.967 0.023




c = 990 0.980 0.011 1.000 0.000
Table 6: Average Best-Response Rate During Last Five Periods
Ho: mean(lower cost) - mean(higher cost) = diff = 0
Ha: diff < 0
Blocks 1 through 5: n=60 Blocks 3, 4, and 5: n=36
Mean SE P-value Mean SE P-value




c = 500 6731.667 166.324 6447.222 179.792




c = 900 5158.667 98.490 5358.333 107.397




c = 950 5030.667 151.618 5175.833 152.232




c = 990 5261.067 113.684 5591.500 102.900
Table 7: Average Payoff of First Five Periods by Cost
Ho: mean(lower cost) - mean(higher cost) = diff = 0
Ha: diff > 0 for c ∈ {50, 500, 900, 950}. Ha: diff < 0 for c ∈ {950, 990}
17
Blocks 1 through 5: n=60 Blocks 3, 4, and 5: n=36
Mean SE P-value Mean SE P-value




c = 500 7489.444 166.577 7075.000 196.268




c = 900 5652.667 54.150 5769.630 46.402




c = 950 5559.833 97.730 5628.704 117.619




c = 990 5650.022 53.773 5807.833 43.352
Table 8: Average Payoff of 15 Periods by Cost
Ho: mean(lower cost) - mean(higher cost) = diff = 0
Ha: diff > 0 for c ∈ {50, 500, 900, 950}. Ha: diff < 0 for c ∈ {950, 990}
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Figure 4: Average Effort of Last Five Periods by Cost (See Table 2 for Numbers)
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Figure 5: A Sample Result From a Block of Sessions
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Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Effort Levels by Cost






































































































(a) c = 990




























All Blocks Blocks 3,4,5



























All Blocks Blocks 3,4,5
Figure 10: Average Payoff of 15 Periods by Cost (All Blocks)
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